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ABSTRACT
Why do prison gangs exist? Despite the prominence of formal governance
mechanisms, inmates also require self-governance institutions to facilitate
illicit trade. This article examines how inmates enforce agreements in the illicit
contraband trade and how they resolve social disputes. We ﬁrst describe how
the informal prison society operates as a community responsibility system.
We then present a model of prison gang organization that accounts for both
environmental factors and the endogenous actions of the prison administra-
tion, encapsulated in the “warden.” We ﬁnd that gangs organize based on
exogenous characteristics. The “warden” diﬀuses gang inﬂuence by maintain-
ing the oligopolistic structure, which limits contraband but allows for orderly
private allocation of prison-provided goods and dispute resolution.
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1 Introduction
Prior to the 1950s, prison gangs did not exist in any state or federal correctional
facilities in the United States; prison gangs have now proliferated throughout the
nation’s prisons and jails (Camp and Camp, 1985). What factors account for prison
gang growth? Based on television and ﬁlm depictions of prison life the answer may
seem obvious: racist inmates join gangs to participate in tribal warfare against
inmates of other races. By this explanation, gangs form to engage in violence,
and in fact, correctional oﬃcials frequently report that gangs form to “promote
violence” (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2012b, p. 2).
However, this contradicts the broader empirical pattern of prison misconduct. Over
the same period that the number of prison gangs and gang members has increased,
prison violence has declined dramatically. For instance, the rate of inmate homicides
declined 94% between 1973 and 2003 (Useem and Piehl, 2008, pp. 81–115). Research
has also found that some prison gang members are no more likely to engage in
violent misconduct behind bars than non-gang inmates (Gaes et al., 2002), and they
are not more likely to be incarcerated for a violent oﬀense (California Department
of Corrections, 1975, p. 67). If inmates form gangs primarily to facilitate violence,
they are not succeeding. Likewise, a second puzzle arises from the depiction of
gangs as promoting hateful, racist ideologies. Racially discriminatory behaviors
and beliefs appear to have been declining since at least the 1940s (Pinker, 2012,
pp. 464–473). If society is becoming more tolerant, then we should see a decline
rather than an increase in gangs that purportedly form to promote racism. Despite
popular depictions of prison gangs, neither a desire for violence nor racism appears
consistent with broader trends.
We oﬀer a diﬀerent explanation for prison gangs. In short, inmates join gangs to
promote cooperation and trust, which facilitates illegal contraband markets. Prison
gangs form to provide extralegal governance in social and economic interactions.
Our theory is well expressed by an expert on prison gangs, a Hispanic male who
served six years in the California prison system for robbery and assault. He explains:
The boys inside, they follow the rules and that means you work with
your own boys and do what they say. Look, there is a lot of problems
caused by the gangs, no doubt. The thing is, they solve problems too.
You want a structure and you want someone to organize the businesses
so the gangs have their rules. You don’t run up a drug debt, you don’t
start a ﬁght in the yard and stuﬀ. Gangs are a problem but we took
care of business. There is a code of silence, you don’t talk about all the
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stuﬀ with others, the cops split up gangs if there’s a big problem so we
keep to ourselves and mind our own business
(Trammell, 2009, p. 755).
Our explanation of prison gang activity suggests diﬀerent predictions about gang
behavior and is consistent with broader trends about violence and racial tolerance.
It also suggests quite diﬀerent policies for prison wardens and others interested in
reducing violence within prisons.
More generally, the problem facing inmates is one that has faced people through-
out history: how can people engage in trade in the absence of strong, eﬀective
governments. An extensive literature examines the eﬀectiveness of self-enforcing
exchange. Theoretical work suggests that it will be eﬀective in small, close-knit
communities, with good information, populated by people with low time prefer-
ence who interact indeﬁnitely.1 Empirical work shows that these are often suﬃcient
conditions for trade. Decentralized legal systems work especially well within groups
characterized by ethnic and religious homogeneity. Self-governance has proven eﬀec-
tive in remarkably diverse settings from the distant past to the modern day.2
However, eliciting social cooperation is more diﬃcult when it takes places among
people from diﬀerent groups. Traders may not share the same language, culture,
mental models, social knowledge, family ties, religion, and history that facilitate
information transmission, reputation, and punishment mechanisms within groups.
Punishing opportunistic behavior has public good characteristics, so the greater
diversity that exists between groups tends to undermine enforcement (Habyari-
mana et al., 2007). Multiple groups may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to converge on an
accepted standard of behavior and the proper sanctions for infringements. People
are less likely to have other-regarding preferences for non-group members. By deﬁ-
nition, diﬀerent groups are less tightly knit, making monitoring and punishment of
opportunistic behavior more diﬃcult.
Nonetheless, important work identiﬁes mechanisms that allow intergroup trade
to thrive. Leeson (2008) examines pre-colonial African trade, showing that for-
1 Powell and Stringham (2009) survey the literature on self-enforcing exchange, and see also
classic work by Axelrod (1984). Dixit (2004) provides a superb theoretical discussion of law-
lessness and economics. Bush and Mayer (1974) present a model of property rights emergence
in anarchy, which was followed by work from Hirshleifer (1995, 2001), Skaperdas (1992), and
Sutter (1995).
2 See important works by Umbeck (1977a,b, 1981), Friedman (1979), Landa (1981, 1994), Benson
(1989, 1990), Greif (1989, 1993), Milgrom et al. (1990), Ellickson (1991), Bernstein (1992),
Clay (1997), Stringham (2003), Anderson and Hill (2004), Richman (2006), Schaeﬀer (2008),
and Koyama (2012).
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eigners were able to trade with locals by ﬁnding ways to signal their trustworthi-
ness ex-ante, in part, by adopting local religion and language. Traders used credit
instruments to exchange with parties where there was a substantial asymmetry of
power and therefore insecure property rights (Leeson, 2007b). The constitutional-
democratic governance mechanisms used by racially diverse pirates made them
eﬀective plunderers (Leeson, 2007a, 2009a,b, 2010). A decentralized legal system
known as the Leges Marchiarum maintained order between warring members of
adversarial groups along the Anglo-Scottish borderland (Leeson, 2009b).3 These
studies suggest that real-world governance institutions can emerge to solve a variety
of intergroup coordination and cooperation problems.
In particular, a community responsibility system (CRS) has often played an
important role in governing social interactions (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Greif,
2006a,b, pp. 309–349). In such a system, all members of the group are responsible
for the actions and debts of any other member. Consider a situation where a mem-
ber of Group A borrows money from a member of Group B. If Member A defaults
on the debt, then all members of Group A are responsible for repaying it. If Group
A does not suitably compensate Member B, then Group B boycotts Group A. If
there are substantial beneﬁts available from future interactions with Group B, then
the threat of boycott induces payment by Group A. This system is especially eﬀec-
tive when it is less costly to learn the trustworthiness of a group than to discern
the trustworthiness of a stranger. Groups can monitor their members at lower cost
than outsiders can, so they can punish bad behavior more easily. Moreover, the
corporate nature of the group creates a repeated play scenario among groups even
though particular members may never trade again. When groups have reputations
for taking responsibility for its members’ actions, then two members of diﬀerent
groups who do not know each other can still beneﬁts from trade. Importantly, this
takes place in a context of impersonal exchange, where two parties do not anticipate
interacting in the future and each lacks the ability to report misconduct to future
traders. The CRS provides a way for people to trade widely in the absence of an
eﬀective legal system.
To better understand the robustness of self-enforcing trade, this article focuses on
two aspects of the community responsibility system. First, despite the eﬀectiveness
of the CRS in past studies, we know little about how robust it is to agent type.
Successful merchants, for instance, may be more cooperative because of higher social
standing or intelligence (Jones, 2008). We therefore examine a context where the
3 These results are robust across a number of diﬀerent historical, commercial, and social settings
(Leeson, 2005a,b, 2006, 2008).
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people involved are more likely to be untrustworthy and closer to a “worst case” type
than among successful commercial participants — prison. Inmates have relatively
low levels of education, high discount rates, and low self-control (Glaeser, 1998; Lee
and McCrary, 2005; Pratt and Cullen, 2000). We argue that inmates today use a
CRS system to govern a contraband trade that takes place among a large group of
heterogeneous people in California’s state prisons. Starting with classic works by
Schelling (1971) and Gambetta (1993), a fascinating literature demonstrates that
the distinguishing characteristic of maﬁa-like groups is that they provide governance
when the state cannot or will not do so (Skaperdas, 2001; Varese, 2005, 2011; Sobel
and Osoba, 2009). Using evidence from ﬁeld interviews conducted by Trammell
(2009, 2011), this article demonstrates the pivotal role played by prison gangs in
providing extralegal governance in the inmate social system and ﬁnds that a CRS
can be robust to agent type.
Second, past work has questioned the eﬀectiveness of a CRS when group size is
asymmetric. It is less costly for members of large groups to take advantage of mem-
bers of small groups because they still have access to many trading partners should
they be ostracized or boycotted by the small group (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Lee-
son, 2005a,b). Based partly on Trammell’s research, past work has already argued
that prison gangs form to provide governance (Skarbek, 2012, 2013), and previ-
ous research has examined the internal organization of a particular gang (Skarbek,
2010a,b; Leeson and Skarbek, 2010). A key question that has not been addressed in
the literature, which we examine here in Section 3, is the question of optimal gang
size, the optimal number of prison gangs, and the optimal response by oﬃcials. We
develop a model to understand the optimal number of groups to operate within a
CRS. One implication of the model is that groups have an incentive to limit their
size so that they can credibly participate in a CRS. We use this model to under-
stand what incentives an outside observer — in this case, a warden — would have
to encourage group formation. Counterintuitively, the formation of groups within
this “worst case” scenario serves to suppress rather than foster illicit activity and
encourage order among inmates.
2 Prison Gangs Operate in a Community Responsibility System
Contraband goods and services are one of the most important ways that inmates
ease the pains of imprisonment (Kalinich, 1980; Irwin, 1980; Kalinich and Stojkovic,
1985). Some of the most common types of contraband are drugs, alcohol, tobacco,
and mobile phones. There are no reliable data on the volume of goods traded in
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contraband markets, but anecdotal evidence suggests it is substantial.4 Former
Warden Patrick Arvonio explains the widespread availability and use of drugs,
noting “Nobody can convince me that there’s a county jail, a prison, a juvenile
detention center, or any other place where you have drug addicts locked up, that
there’s not drugs in the facility. There is no such place” (Levin, 1996). One report
ﬁnds that 44 inmates in California prisons died of drug overdoses between 2005
and 2008 (Washington Times, 2010). More recently, a thriving market in mobile
phones has arisen. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
seized 15,000 phones from inmates in 2011 alone (California Council on Science
and Technology, 2012). If we assume a 25 percent interdiction rate, this suggests
there were 60,000 contraband phones behind bars. During 11 days at one prison,
oﬃcials used a special device to detect more than 25,000 unauthorized calls, texts,
and internet requests (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
2012a). Oﬃcials at the maximum-security prison at Corcoran even conﬁscated two
cell phones from Charles Manson. Contraband markets are working.
Prison gangs play a central role in contraband activity (Irwin, 1980, p. 206;
Blatchford, 2008). A prison gang is an “organization which operates within the
prison system as a self-perpetuating criminally oriented entity, consisting of a select
group of inmates who have established an organized chain of command and are
governed by an established code of conduct” (Lyman, 1989, p. 48). Prison gangs
often adopt written constitutions, have a lifetime membership requirement, and
engage in criminal activity both behinds bars and often on the street (Skarbek,
2010a,b; Skarbek, 2011). Nearly every prison gang restricts its membership to people
of one race or ethnicity and often by an inmate’s area of geographic origin.
Not all California inmates are full “made” members of prison gangs, but many
aﬃliate with some racial group or gang (Knox, 2006; Blatchford, 2012; Morales,
2008). In 2002, a high-ranking oﬃcial testiﬁed that there were 40,000–60,000 gang
members in California prisons, 25–38% of inmates (Petersilia, 2006, p. 35). Gang
membership is so common that prior to a Supreme Court ruling in 2005, inmate
reception forms asked an inmate to check a box to indicate with which gang he
aﬃliated (Goodman, 2008). A gang investigator at Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility describes gangs’ widespread inﬂuence, “What people don’t realize is that
almost everything that happens in a prison setting has some sort of gang involve-
ment, whether it be extortion, intimidations, traﬃcking narcotics. There’s nothing
4 Context speciﬁc studies consistently ﬁnd that contraband is available and important. For
instance, Kalinich (1980) and Kalinich and Stojkovic (1985) document the volume of contra-
band in a particular prison.
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that goes on that at least one gang member is not involved with” (MSNBC, 2005).
Prison oﬃcials report, “almost without exception. . . the gangs are responsible for
the majority of drug traﬃcking in their institutions” (Camp and Camp, 1985, p. 52).
As past work on P.O.W. camps and prisons has argued, inmates cannot rely on oﬃ-
cial mechanisms of social control to facilitate illicit markets (Radford, 1945; Sykes,
1958 [2007]; Kaminski, 2004). For instance, they cannot rely on correctional oﬃ-
cers to enforce agreements made in drug deals, punish people who do not pay their
drug debts, or knowingly protect a drug stash. For these illicit markets to operate,
inmates must create extralegal governance institutions.
A CRS provides the institutional foundation that facilitates the contraband trade.
Prison gangs and other inmate groups are the “communities” that inmates join.
Nearly all inmates have to aﬃliate with a prison gang or inmate group. A correc-
tional oﬃcer at Corcoran State Prison explains, “When you come to prison, you
have to join a gang. You have no choice. It’s a must. Whatever race backs you up,
you need to be in their gang. Because you have no protection. You’re on your own.
And anything can happen to you” (MSNBC, 2009).5
As an inmate enters the prison system, both correctional oﬃcers and other
inmates tell him that he must aﬃliate with a gang. An inmate who was incarcerated
for ﬁve years for assault with a deadly weapon explains, “I’m a white guy, so I can
only hang with white guys in prison. The COs [correctional oﬃcers] told me that I
would only run with the white guys. I knew that going in, but they told me too. A
guy, a white guy, came up to me right away and told me to get with the skins and
I’d be okay.” (Trammell, 2011, p. 27).
The more extensively an inmate wishes to engage in the underground economy,
the more important it is that he aﬃliates with a gang. When conﬂicts arise, an
inmate can appeal to his own group’s leader to meet with the leader of the oﬀending
inmate’s group. If the oﬀending member is not aﬃliated with a group, then there
is no community that can put pressure on him to make restitution or to do so
themselves. As such, social and commercial interactions with an unaﬃliated inmate
face a higher risk of opportunism. Inmates encourage everyone to have an aﬃliation.
For instance, one white inmate explains how he and his associates would complain
to inmates from other races if they did not quickly bring new inmates into the
fold. He explains, “The black dudes were slow at training their new guys. When
they [white inmates] come in, we have a talk and set them straight. My boys were
on it; you cannot fuck around and let this slide. The Mexicans, they know what’s
5 A lieutenant at San Quentin State Prison communicated the same message to one of the
authors on a visit to the facility.
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what and they were quick, but the black guys, that’s a diﬀerent story. I had to
remind them several times, you know, ‘You have a new boy on the yard’ and stuﬀ”
(Trammell, 2011, p. 28). If new inmates do not align with a group, then a CRS
operates less eﬀectively.
Inmates must be able to credibly signal their aﬃliation to strangers. This ensures
that a gang is not held responsible for the actions of non-members. Inmates signal
gang aﬃliation in several ways. First, nearly all gangs are racially segregated. An
inmate’s race is the most easily observed characteristic in an all-male environment
with standard-issue clothing. This information identiﬁes to which subset of all prison
gangs an inmate might belong. Second, gang members often get prominent tattoos
that identify their aﬃliation (Valentine, 2000). Inmates wear these on their necks,
arms, hands, and faces. Because these tattoos are prominent and permanent, they
provide a credible signal of one’s group aﬃliation (Kaminski, 2003, 2004; Gambetta,
2009). Strangers know with whom they can trade by their group aﬃliation, and
members cannot avoid taking responsibility for their associates.
Active participation in the underground economy requires membership in the
community responsibility system, and all gang members are responsible for any
member’s actions. For example, if a member of Gang A purchases drugs on credit
from someone in Gang B, then Gang A is responsible for his payment of that debt.
If the individual does not pay, then the drug dealer can appeal to the leaders of
Gang A for relief. The leader, or “shot caller” in prison parlance, will either pay
the debt, force his member to pay the debt or work for them (perhaps assaulting
an enemy of Gant B), assault the inmate to appease the drug dealer, or hand him
over to Gang B to assault him in a controlled manner. As one prison gang member
explains, “It was my responsibility on the yard to ensure that . . . our people were
not harmed by another race. I took care of the drug debts. If one of our people
became delinquent in a drug debt to another race, it was my responsibility to either
cover their drug debt or have them stabbed. In which case, we would send one of
ours to stab him” (MSNBC, 2009). If the drug dealer from Gang B is conﬁdent that
Gang A has a good reputation for taking responsibility for its members’ actions,
then he will be willing to sell drugs on credit to people whom he does not know
personally.
A former inmate describes self-policing in the system, “If one of my guys is
messing up then we either oﬀer him up to the other guys or we take him down
ourselves. Like I had a guy that ran up a big drug debt, he owed money to the woods
[peckerwood skin-head gang] and I had to turn him over to them. They took him to
a cell and really beat the shit out of him. We had to do it. If not, then everyone ﬁghts
Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System 231
which is bad for business and bad for us” (Trammell, 2009, pp. 763–764). Gangs
hold members responsible so that they can continue to conduct illicit business.
Prison gangs resolve both social and commercial conﬂicts among inmates. Dis-
putes arise when inmates feel disrespected, drug deals and drug debts go wrong,
and when stolen from (Trammell, 2011, p. 90). The shot callers monitor inmates’
behavior and seek out solutions when problems arise. A former inmate in California
explains, “So here’s the deal, you got old guys like me who have been in prison
forever and have shot-callers do their job, keep peace and run the action. That’s
why we have shot-callers so when a couple of idiots get into it in the yard, instead
of letting them kill themselves, the shot-caller goes out and works it out. He talks
to these guys and ﬁnds out what happened, who did what to who it’s very simple”
(Trammell, 2009, pp. 762–763).
A white inmate who served eight years in prison describes the in-group policing
practiced by gangs, “I knew this guy that ran his mouth a lot, made lots of problems,
called people names and stuﬀ. He called these Mexican guys a bunch of greasy
wetbacks. He’s a loose cannon, he’s going to cause trouble you know what I mean,
we work hard to keep that race shit calm and here is this prick causing trouble, no
one wants that so we had to check him. We took him down a peg or two, it came
right from the top, the asshole needs a lesson” (Trammell, 2009, p. 764). A black
inmate explains how gangs establish order by enforcing rules about interacting with
other groups. He explains that he was surprised to ﬁnd his associates upset with
him after he insulted a white inmate, “When I ﬁrst got to prison, I said some shit to
this white guy and the next thing I know, I’m told to make it right with him. I have
to man up and take care of my shit. At ﬁrst I thought, you gotta be kidding me.
No way am I going to tell this guy that I’m sorry. Then they told me that I have no
choice. That’s the rule, you do what you’re told. They made a very good argument
about how I need to fall in line. Okay, so I made things right” (Trammell, 2009,
p. 766). Another inmate explains, “if someone pisses me oﬀ, you know starts trouble
with me, he has to answer to his own people. They decide if it’s worth ﬁghting over
you know? If they decide that he’s just a big dick and he needs to apologize to me
for being a dick then he will tell me he’s sorry. That’s how it usually ends. Nothing
too dramatic” (Trammell, 2009, p. 760).
An inmate who did eight years for manslaughter explains, “you can talk with
the leaders if you want to ﬁght, that’s ﬁne, but you cannot just jump a guy in
the yard . . . The guards will see that something is up and they’ll start watching
us . . . you start bringing down another guy, and now everyone is involved and it’s
a mess. So I say, look, talk to the leaders, see if they’ll let you take the guy down in
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a blind spot or in their cell. Keep that shit low-key, right? No need to bring in the
cops over some name calling. We can take care of that” (Trammell, 2011, p. 29).
Another inmate explains, “if someone disses me or someone takes my stuﬀ then the
leaders tell us to take it to the cell. We slug it out and get things taken care of”
(Trammell, 2009, pp. 760–761). Gangs provide governance.
3 Modeling the Organization of Prison Gangs
The primary purpose of a CRS within prison is to ensure the orderly functioning of
a contraband market and to settle disputes amongst inmates. As such, gangs can be
viewed as both ﬁrms (producers of contraband) and quasi-governments (providers
of dispute resolution lying outside the scope of prison authorities).6 When consid-
ering gangs in the former sense, the question remains: what ﬁrm-like organizational
costs facilitate the formation of gangs and why does an “oligopolistic” structure
dominate the prison world? When considering gangs in the latter sense, as resolvers
of disputes, the pertinent question is what sort of gang structure (if any) might
be optimal from the perspective of resource-constrained prison authorities. To the
extent that this optimal structure diﬀers across the dual perspectives of the gang
and the “warden”, the latter will use available resources to modify the prevailing
prison environment.
3.1 A Model of the Optimal Number of Prison Gangs
There are numerous prison gangs in each prison, and multiple prison gangs of
the same race. What determines the optimal number and size of prison gangs?
Consider the average cost of operation per person to a prison gang as a function
of its size, where size is deﬁned as the absolute number of gang members.7 As
a gang increases in size, the ﬁxed costs of gang organization diminish on a per
person basis. For example, it is easier for a gang to control a particular set of
tables if there are more people there. Another beneﬁt from increased size is that a
larger gang can make use of members’ comparative advantages more extensively. For
instance, internal FBI documents report that Aryan Brotherhood (AB) members
“felt that the AB needed diﬀerent types of individual’s with diﬀerent skills and not
6 On the relationship between gangs and governments, see Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995).
7 Naturally, an organization such as a prison gang will exhibit some form of hierarchy and,
therefore, “degrees of membership” (see, e.g., Leeson and Skarbek, 2010). For the sake of
expositional simplicity, however, assume that an inmate either is or is not a member of a gang.
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just a mindless bunch of murderers. Attempts would therefore be made to recruit
explosives experts, chemists, people with legal backgrounds, conmen, and people
who would be able to run scams inside and outside the prison” (Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 2012, p. 145). Gangs also establish particular roles and areas of
specialization (Skarbek, 2010a,b; Mendoza, 2012). If increased size allows a gang to
control a larger portion of the illicit trade, then they can also reduce the volume of
trade and increase the price of contraband to monopoly levels.8 The function ρ(n)
in Figure 1 expresses this diminishing cost to gang operation.
However, there are also costs to increasing the size of a prison gang. Gangs
must be concerned with the bargaining costs inherent in the division of the gang’s
proﬁts and the general cohesion and solidarity necessary for eﬀective gang operation.
Internal conﬂict reduces the eﬀectiveness of the gang, and in fact, is a major obstacle
to their successful operation (see, for instance, United States v Shryock et al.,
2003). Inmates might no longer uphold each other’s responsibilities, making trade
less possible. Internal ﬁghting will make the organized traﬃcking and sale of drugs
more diﬃcult (United States v Shryock et al., 2003; Mendoza, 2012). These costs
are an increasing function of a group’s heterogeneity and, therefore, its size within
a ﬁxed prison population (Buchanan, 1965; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).9 These
increased bargaining costs are reﬂected by the cost function β(n) in Figure 1.
The existence of the β(n) function hampers the possibility of a natural monopoly
on contraband within a given prison population, as average costs are increasing
rather than decreasing when the gang grows beyond k∗ (as illustrated in Figure 1).
A limit to cost-eﬃcient growth in gang size suggests an oligopolistic structure,
whereby the overall prison population forms cooperative groups of approximate
size k∗.10
Given an arbitrary, optimal gang size, k∗, consider the basis for gang organization.
Each individual inmate within a ﬁxed prison population of size N has an arbitrary
number, M , of exogenous characteristics including race, geographic origin, street
gang aﬃliation, human and social capital, and prior criminal record. Each inmate
also has an endogenous level of potential commitment to a prison gang (which is the
8 The existence of independent smugglers may, however, limit the degree of mark-up on gang-
provided contraband. Prison gangs typically drive out sole proprietors (Irwin, 1980, p. 211).
9 This relates more generally to the literature on clubs (Cornes and Sandler, 1996) and how they
promote group contributions in a variety of settings (Iannaccone, 1992; Berman, 2000; Berman
and Laitin, 2008).
10 While the speciﬁc shape of the cost functions in Figure 1 is open to speculation, prison gangs
both exist and are several within any given prison, thereby ruling out the possibility of a corner
solution to the gang’s cost minimization problem.
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Figure 1. Prison gang costs as a function of gang size.
inverse of commitment to all other social aﬃliations and non-gang, moneymaking
enterprises). These attributes can be expressed in the matrix:
Xn,m ≡
x1,1 x1,2 · · · x1,M d1
x2,1 x2,2 · · · x2,M d2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
xN,1 xN,2 · · · xN,M dn
where xn,m is exogenous attribute m of inmate n and dn is the endogenous level of
potential gang commitment by n.
Insofar as exogenous characteristics are unrelated to the scale economies captured
in the function ρ(n), gangs will organize around the attribute or attributes which
allow for gang categories that: (i) minimize bargaining costs and maximize cohesion
for any given gang size and (ii) divide the prison population into groups of approx-
imately cost-eﬃcient size, k∗. As in the organization of terrorist groups, cultural
considerations are often an eﬀective mechanism for promoting internal cohesiveness
(Munger, 2006, see also Landa, 1981, 1994; Bernstein, 1992). A race-based system
carries the added advantage of quickly identifying gang aﬃliation to other inmates.
An organizational system based on one exogenous characteristic may, however,
yield gangs that are either considerably larger or smaller than k∗. In such cases,
auxiliary exogenous factors will be used to break up excessively large gangs or to
consolidate excessively small gangs. In California, for example, the existence of a
single Hispanic gang within many prisons would be untenably large. Consequently,
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geography is employed as a secondary criterion that segments the broader Hispanic
inmate population into smaller, more eﬃcient groups. Hispanic inmates sort into
gangs based on whether they come from northern California, southern California,
or the Fresno area. Conversely, Irish-American or German-American gangs would
likely be ineﬃciently small, thus “white” gangs consolidate these negligible factions
into a larger, more eﬀective subgroup of inmates.
Exogenous factors may also be employed ex post, notably via the practice of gang
tattooing. Such non-reversible acts of gang allegiance serve dual purposes within
the previous formal framework. First, gang tattoos create an exogenous and wholly
gang-speciﬁc attribute that transcends the mere gang eligibility associated with
membership in a particular exogenous category. In other words, tattoos create a
superior and exogenous “gang member” category that further minimizes bargain-
ing costs. The introduction of this practice shifts down the bargaining costs of an
increased gang membership, thereby expanding optimal gang size. Second, tattoos
and other non-revocable acts of solidarity identify those inmates whose ex ante
level of commitment, dn, was high. Gangs can thereby separate eligible members
into those of high and low endogenous commitment to the gang, diminishing the
operational costs of gang activity for any given gang size (see Iannaccone, 1992;
D’Amico, 2008; Gambetta, 2009).11
3.2 The Role of the Warden
Despite the prospective beneﬁts of forming and maintaining gangs of optimal size,
inmate activity is subject to surveillance and interference by prison authorities,
which we encapsulate for the purposes of the model within the person of the prison
warden. For the warden, there are several potential beneﬁts from the existence of
prison gangs. They provide relatively peaceable dispute resolution amongst inmates.
Gangs wish to avoid riots and conceal ﬁstﬁghts. Gangs also help allocate scarce
prison resources, such as benches and basketball courts, in the face of a shortage
of such amenities. While a drastic reduction in the inmate population might ease
such tensions, there is good reason to believe that under prevailing circumstances,
the optimal number of prison gangs from the perspective of the warden is not zero.
As Buchanan (1972) observes in relation to the activities of organized crime, a
11 Questions of gang hierarchy as such are beyond the scope of our analysis. However, one would
naturally suppose that the same problems of size and associated heterogeneity that make proﬁt
division and cohesion diﬃcult introduce a destabilizing chasm between the highest and lowest
ranks of gang membership (Leeson and Skarbek, 2010).
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monopoly is socially desirable when the industry in question produces bads rather
than goods. From the warden’s perspective, the smuggling of contraband is a bad.
Oﬃcials will also prefer an oligopolistic market over a competitive one if oﬃcials
can engage in corrupt practices, such as extracting bribes from prison drug dealers,
because total proﬁts and, hence, potential bribes will be higher. A contraband
market comprised of a few, large gangs acting as an oligopoly is therefore likely to
be preferable to a large pool of independent dealers, insofar as scale economies do
not signiﬁcantly shift the supply function outward.12
The horizontal axis in Figure 2 spans the potential number of prison gangs run-
ning from one (a monopoly on contraband and dispute resolution) to N (no gang
organization whatsoever). The curve c(g) depicts the increasing cost to the warden
of both suppressing contraband and allocating inmate amenities as the numbers of
gangs increases. Also included is the cost of monitoring gang activity, which would
naturally increase as the number of gangs under surveillance increases. As the num-
ber of gangs approaches N (where each inmate is a “gang of one”) the situation is
costly for the warden because of a highly competitive contraband market coupled
Figure 2. Costs to warden as a function of the number of gangs.
12 This shift is more likely at the small-scale stages of contraband organization, where a minimal
amount of “teamwork” may yield tremendous reductions in cost. Thus, the warden may prefer
no cooperation whatsoever (i.e., every inmate his own gang) or the existence of three gangs
(where oligopolistic restrictions in the quantity of contraband are meaningful) to the existence
of nine gangs (where scale economies operate but a competitive environment keeps prices low
and output high).
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with a lack of gang-provided mechanisms for dispute resolution and public resource
allocation.
The power for inmates to settle their own disputes is, however, a double-edged
sword, as this same power can also be used to challenge the control of the warden.
Intra-gang disputes, which are more likely as the size and associated heterogeneity
of the gang increase, may also require the intervention of prison authorities. For
instance, inﬁghting within the Mexican Maﬁa and the Nuestra Familia require extra
staﬀ, attention, and security to control (Blatchford, 2008; Mendoza, 2012). Thus,
the costs of internal and external gang friction, f(g), are decreasing in the number
of prison gangs. As in the case of optimal gang size, total gang externalities (TGE)
are minimized somewhere between no gang organization whatsoever (g = N) and
a single, monopolistic gang (g = 1).
The existence of joint, U-shaped cost curves, both to inmates with respect to
gang size and the warden with respect to the number of gangs (presumed to be a
decreasing function of gang size), imply that the warden may be in one of three
situations: (I) the number of gangs is of approximately optimal size such that g is
approximately equal to g∗. (II) g is far greater than g∗, implying that gangs are
too numerous. (III) g is far lower than g∗, implying that gangs are too few and,
accordingly, too large.
Scenario I does not create signiﬁcant problems for the warden. Scenario II implies
that prison resources should be used to eliminate existing prison gangs. Increas-
ing administrative pressure on the leaders of marginal gangs may provoke dissolu-
tion, which will directly diminish the number of prison gangs.13 Section 2 provided
evidence of “oﬀ the record” gang membership advice as commonly given to new
inmates by prison authorities. Accordingly, correctional oﬃcers could steer or pres-
sure inmates into joining only a few speciﬁc gangs. Alternatively, increased pressure
on marginal members of smaller gangs which share primary attributes (e.g., race
but not geography) may shrink these gangs to the extent that their consolidation
by alliance is mutually advantageous. In addition, facilitation of gang bargaining
and commitment mechanisms will shift down the β(n) curve, which will encourage
the expansion of existing gangs.
Lastly, Scenario III implies that prison resources should be used to split up exist-
ing gangs (insofar as such factionalization does not cause excessive rancor and
13 Of course, continued pressure may be needed to prevent the spontaneous reformation of poten-
tially “dormant” gangs once dissolved.
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thereby exacerbate gang externalities).14 As per the X matrix, strategic separation
of race-based gangs may facilitate their further division, for example by geography.
Alternatively, a general prison crackdown that makes intra-gang bargaining more
costly will put pressure on “excessively” large gangs to shed marginal members.
4 Conclusion
Data on the number of gangs and the number of gang members is one of the
most elusive ﬁgures in criminal justice studies (Trulson et al., 2006, p. 26). No
reliable data exist. However, the theory of the organization of gangs suggests several
empirical predictions. First, gangs ought to be approximately similar in size for
diﬀerent racial groups. This will be true even when their relative proportion of the
prison population diﬀers. Second, the presence and number of prison gangs depends
on the size of the prison population rather than the size of the general population
in the community. This would explain why the presence of street gangs is a poor
predictor of a state’s prison gang presence and activity (Skarbek, 2013). Third, riots
and other displays of public violence should be less frequent when gangs exist. Riots
disrupt illicit exchange, so gangs have an incentive to control them. Consistent with
this claim, the rate of inmate homicides and prison riots have been declining since
the 1970s, at the same time as gangs have proliferated (Useem and Piehl, 2008,
p. 94). It may be that other factors explain some or all of this trend, but it is
consistent with the argument oﬀered here. Fourth, the theory suggests a positive
relationship between gangs and the amount of illicit trade in prison. Consistent
with this, gangs are the major source of illicit contraband in prisons (Camp and
Camp, 1985). Because of the lack of data, each of these is speculative, but unlike
explanations that rely on inmates’ violent or racist nature, it is consistent with
broader empirical trends. Lastly, the dual-perspective nature of the theory dictates
both an optimal gang size and an optimal number of gangs. In tandem, these joint
optima suggest an ideal number of inmates for the minimization of gang friction
that is independent of the physical prison facility. Thus, all things being equal,
especially large and small prison populations should prove most troublesome for
authorities to manage.
14 We are reluctant to suggest that the warden should or is likely to actually encourage the
formation of gangs amongst unaﬃliated inmates, as this may solve the problem of diﬀusing the
power of existing gangs but does not diminish the externalities from conﬂict within existing
and “excessively” large gangs.
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We have examined an unusual context to understand a more general problem —
impersonal exchange. Prisons force strangers to interact with each other, and many
inmates choose to participate in contraband markets. They cannot rely on formal
mechanisms of governance to provide social control in many of these interactions.
In California, inmates rely on gangs and other inmate groups to deﬁne and enforce
property rights, adjudicate disputes, and facilitate trade. Rather than viewing these
groups as forming to promote violence or racism, we argue that gangs play an
important, productive, and contractual role in the prison community. By operat-
ing in a CRS, gangs help inmates to capture the beneﬁts of mutually beneﬁcial
exchange. From the inmates’ perspectives, this enhances welfare. The eﬀectiveness
of a CRS is not dependent on agents having a relatively cooperative type. Finally,
from the perspective of prison authorities, the optimal number of prison gangs is
not zero. They too can beneﬁt from the peaceful resolution of disputes, even if they
do not value greater market satisfaction for illicit contraband.
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